Tekijänoikeuden erikoiskirjasto

*000      ab a        ar
*00117270
*008      s2022||||gw |||||||||||||||||eng||            
*040  $aFI-CUTE$bfin$erda
*0410 $aeng
*1001 $aMaggiolino, Mariateresa,$ekirjoittaja.
*24510$aAntitrust, Pricing Algorithms and the Liable Humans Behind Them /$cMariateresa Maggiolino.
*264 1$aMünchen :$bVerlag C.H. Beck,$c2022.
*300  $as. 1121–1122.
*336  $ateksti$btxt$2rdacontent
*337  $akäytettävissä ilman laitetta$bn$2rdamedia
*338  $anide$bnc$2rdacarrier
*4901 $aGRUR International,$x2632-8623 ;$v71(12)
*520  $aIn recent times, there has been much discussion about pricing algorithms and the impact they might have on market dynamics (OECD, 2017). However, many of the fears raised are actually unfounded. Think, for example, about pricing algorithms that enable firms to adjust prices on the fly in response to market demands (Weiss and Mehrotra, 2001). It is true: because of them, the cost of an Uber ride varies depending on the weather conditions and the time of day you request it. However, there is nothing anticompetitive in it. Dynamic prices do support well-functioning markets because they promote efficient resource allocation. They offer firms the opportunity to overcome information asymmetries and the other causes of price stickiness that in the analog economy prevented supply and demand from meeting in real time and on an ongoing basis. Likewise, consider algorithms that allow companies to charge personalized prices, that is, prices that match consumers’ willingness to pay. As a result, if you look up the price of a flight on the internet, you will see it increase the more you search for it. Furthermore, it is true that personalized prices could be subject to consumer protection law, because it could be argued that firms mislead consumers when, for example, they hide from them the personalized nature of the prices charged. Similarly, personalized prices might infringe data protection law if, for example, companies conceal from data subjects that they will use their personal data to calculate such prices. However, personalized prices are unlikely to be an antitrust violation and, should this be the case, they are quite manageable using traditional antitrust tools (OECD, 2018). Indeed, if two or more firms ever agree to charge the same personalized prices (a quite bizarre hypothesis, actually!), antitrust authorities will be faced with an ordinary price-fixing agreement that will easily fall under Art. 101 TFEU. On the other hand, when a dominant firm maximizes its profits by charging customized prices instead of the single monopoly price, antitrust authorities are faced with an ordinary price discrimination scenario. They will find that customized pricing, on the one hand, allows the dominant firm to extract a (significant) portion of the consumer surplus, but on the other hand, it also makes the dominant firm’s products available to those consumers who could not buy them at the monopoly price (Maggiolino, 2017). Thus, following the usual case-by-case approach, antitrust authorities will apply Art. 102 TFEU in cases where the customized prices in question do not lead to an increase in efficiency that compensates for the decrease in consumer surplus.
*650 7$aalgoritmit$0http://www.yso.fi/onto/yso/p14524$2yso/fin
*650 7$ahinnoittelu$2yso/fin$0http://www.yso.fi/onto/yso/p10773
*650 7$averkkopalvelut$0http://www.yso.fi/onto/yso/p6624$2yso/fin
*650 7$atietosuoja$0http://www.yso.fi/onto/yso/p3636$2yso/fin
*650 7$aInternet$0http://www.yso.fi/onto/yso/p20405$2yso/fin
*830 0$aGRUR International,$x2632-8623 ;$v71(12)
*852  $hSA-GRUR International
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